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Wartime Security and Liberty under Law
ROBERT H. JACKSONt
To initiate this series of namesake lecturers is an honor
and its association with the memory of James McCormick
Mitchell imposes a responsibility. Here in Western New
York, when I was admitted to its bar Mr. Mitchell already
ranked high in its long list of eminent advocates, jurists
and intellectual leaders. What Mr. Mitchell was, most of us
young men hoped to become. In the courts, his character,
scholarship, and industry were highly respected-he was
counselor to men of important affairs, his cultural interests
were broader than his craft, and he was among the most
effective influences that fostered this University and its
Law School.
Mr. Mitchell once described the intellectual atmosphere
which then permeated higher professional life by borrowing
the words of his friend and preceptor, John G. Milburn,
another of Buffalo's most gifted advocates:
It is a noble profession and worthy of a man's deepest devotion. It
affords the largest opportunities for the realization of moral ideals,
and it never fails in intellectual interest. Its work is in the main
stream of the life of the time. It may be establishing a rule of law
for the conduct of business, the working out of some adjustment of
the existing legal system to new economic or industrial tendencies,
the organization of a corporation, the formulation of the terms of
an enterprise, or the devolution of an estate. Each day has its
problems requiring thought, study and action. The law itself is
constantly changing in its adaptation to new conditions, new
requirements, new tendencies, new needs. I cannot imagine a
more interesting field of labor. Its satisfactions are the
satisfactions of a mind actively employed in scientific
investigation, in the quest of knowledge and in practical affairs.
Its rewards are position, influence, personal distinction and a

t Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, in an address
delivered at Buffalo Law School, May 9, 1951.
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reasonable affluence. 1

The work which they mention as "in the main stream of
the life of the time," you will notice, does not include many
of today's professional pursuits, such as taxation, labor
relations, or practice before various administrative
tribunals. Two World Wars and world-wide depression
brought new issues. Mr. Milburn omitted any reference to
legal struggles over national security or civil liberty, no
doubt because that time held no serious threat to security
and liberty was taken for granted. The Union had survived,
and the North had recovered from the Civil War. The ideas
of our Declaration of Independence and our Bill of Rights
held the initiative throughout the world and old systems of
autocracy were falling before them. The West was still
lighted by the afterglow of the American Revolution.
Counterrevolution, under the banners of Marxism, had not
yet become a world power, nor had its agents in serious
numbers infiltrated our country to claim shelter of our
Constitution while conspiring to bring about its overthrow.
We can no longer take either security or liberty for
granted. The best that we can now hope for seems to be a
prolonged period of international tension and rumors of
war, with war itself as the ever threatening alternative. For
security against foreign attack we must look to the
professions which manage our armed forces and to the
economy of the country that sustains them. But I see not
the slightest probability in the foreseeable future that any
conqueror can impose oppression upon us, and the dangers
to our liberties which I would discuss with you are those
that we create among ourselves.
The essence of liberty is the rule of law. Only when
impersonal forces which we know as law are strong enough
to restrain both official action and action by private groups
is there real personal liberty. Liberty is not mere absence of
restraint, it is nor a spontaneous product of majority rule, it
is not achieved merely by lifting formerly depressed classes
to power, it is not the inevitable byproduct of technological
advancement. Freedom is achieved only by a complex but
just structure of rules of law, impersonally and dispassionately

1. James McCormick Mitchell, "John G. Milburn," Address at the Thursday
Club (Nov. 1943).
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enforced against both rules and the governed. Because
liberty cannot exist apart from the impartial rule of law, it
is vulnerable to wartime stresses, for then the rule of law
breaks down. The same passions and anxieties may result
from a long period of tension which may be almost as
demoralizing as actual war.
The United States has survived two modern wars
without serious or permanent impairment of our system of
ordered liberty under law. That may be due more to good
fortune than to wisdom. We were not a belligerent in either
World War, except for a part of its duration; continental
United States was never invaded; our cities were not
bombed. While we talked a great deal about "all-out-war,"
we never began to mobilize men or resources or impaired
the civilian standard of living to the extent that Germany
or England did and as we would have to do in a long, hard
war.
But it is even more important to recall that our
Government, during those wars, did not have to combat a
really numerous, cohesive, or well-organized internal
opposition. The Nazis had no effective or far-reaching
underground of their own here. During the time Stalin was
a partner of Hitler, it was the extensive and disciplined
Communist underground which was at their joint service.
That was of sufficient magnitude and efficiency, with
propaganda, political strikes, espionage, and sabotage, to
retard our preparations and to slow aid to victims of
aggression. But before we were attacked, Hitler had turned
on the Soviet Union, and the only way the Communists
could support Russia's war was to support our war. Had not
this change in their course occurred before we became a
belligerent, drastic measures to disable them from doing
harm would certainly have been undertaken.
There is no reason to suppose that we will be so
fortunate again. The only probable future enemy is now
supported by fanatical partisans within our midst. In
strategic places, in communications, government, labor, or
industry, they could give valuable aid and comfort to the
enemy. Probably much greater than their capacity for
actual harm is their capacity to arouse fears and hatreds
among us. A secret conspiratorial group, even if not very
potent itself, can goad the Government into striking blindly
and fiercely at all suspects in a manner inconsistent with
our normal ideas of civil liberties.
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If we take the first ten Amendments to the Constitution
as the legal structure which contains the substance of our
liberties, we find that they fall into two general classes.
Some are primarily addressed to courts and judges and tell
us how we shall manage the judicial process. Others are
addressed primarily to Congress or the Executive and place
limitations on their powers.
Those admonitions addressed to the judges are
designed to keep the judicial process as independent,
neutral, and non-partisan as procedural safeguards can,
and to make certain that courts will not be used as
instruments of oppression or of political policy. These
provisions are relatively explicit and concrete and deal with
well-defined legal concepts or long- established practices.
They are procedural and appeal more to the understanding
of lawyers than of the populace. An excited public opinion
sometimes discredits them as "technicalities" which irritate
by causing delays and permitting escapes from what it
regards as justice. But by and large, sober second thought
sustains most of them as essential safeguards of fair law
enforcement and worth whatever delays or escapes they
cost.
These procedural safeguards include the right of the
people to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and
the requirement of particularity in search warrants; 2
prosecution only by grand jury indictment, prohibition of
double jeopardy for the same offense, the right of an
accused not to be a witness against himself, and the right
not to suffer deprivation of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. 3 They guarantee speedy and public trial
by an impartial jury of the people from the locality where
the crime was committed, the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with
the accusing witnesses, to have compulsory process for
obtaining defense witnesses, and to have assistance of
counsel; 4 the guarantee of jury trial; 5 and the proscription of

2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

3. Id. amend. V.
4. Id. amend. VI.
5. Id. amend. VII.
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excessive bail, fines, or cruel and unusual punishment. 6
These bear primarily on the conduct of judicial business.
Other provisions embody political policies deemed
essential to a free society, and admonish primarily the
political branches of government. Time has rendered some
of these less important, as, for example, those which permit
the people to keep and bear arms 7 and limit the quartering
of soldiers in private homes.8 At least, they are productive
of almost no current litigation. Another which our
forefathers regarded as of prime importance to the
maintenance of liberty was the Tenth Amendment, which
reserved to the States or to the people all undelegated and
unprohibited powers, and was intended to prevent undue
concentration of power and centralization of authority in
the Federal Government. Of course, the allocation of power
between State and Nation is a fundamentally political
question, however it incidentally may be involved in legal
controversies. The one really decisive conflict between the
central and local government was settled only by civil war. I
am not sure that this part of the Bill of Rights is not on its
way to obsolescence as a legal doctrine, whatever it may
have of political vitality. Contentions based on it have not
prospered in the Supreme Court in recent years, although
at former times they found considerable hospitality there.
The Tenth Amendment may become as impotent juridically
as the provision that each State is guaranteed republican
form of government which the courts candidly reject as
legally enforceable doctrine and regard as presenting only
political issues.9
Legal controversy has more and more been generated
by the Amendments that primarily are restraints upon the
Legislative or Executive branches of governments. Chief
sources of litigation for many years were the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
applied as limitation on substantive law.10 Recently,
6. Id. amend. VIII.
7. Id. amend. II.
8. Id. amend. III.
9. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
10. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are distinguished as to
their disabling effect on government in dissent in Railway Express Agency v.
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litigation has more often succeeded by invoking the First
Amendment, now applied to prohibit abridgment of freedom
of speech, press, assembly, and religion and establishment
of religion by states, cities, school boards, and local courts,
as well as by congress.1 1
Whatever the defects of our constitutional system of
legal liberties, however much the generality of their
statement permits uncertain applications and varying
interpretations, it can hardly be questioned that they have
guided the courts in normal times to a protection of the
rights of the individual against the mass, and the citizen
against the government, that compares favorably with the
conditions of any nation. We should not forget, however,
that we are not the only people who love and cherish
liberty, and we are not the only ones to find that external
pressures and threats produce internal reactions which
divert their institutions from their usual course.
Some modern nations have forthrightly recognized that
war or external dangers do upset the normal balance
between liberty and authority. They have recognized, too,
that fear and anxiety create public demands for greater
assurance which may not be justified by necessity but
which any popular government finds irresistible. They have
met this by providing for some emergency powers or
temporary crisis government. Their experiments are well
worth study, though time today permits only most general
reference. 12
After the First World War, the Weimar Constitution
guaranteed freedom of opinion and expression, of assembly
and association, and inviolability of the person and of

New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949). See Charles M. Hough, Due Process of
Law-To-day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218, 228 (1918). The history of due process
litigation is set out in ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 24-74 (1941).
11. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Illinois, ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203 (1948); Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v.
Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).

12.

CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT

IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948), is a comprehensive
government in Germany, England, and France.

study of crisis in
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domicile, to the Germans. For its time and place, it
constituted a rather advanced bill of rights in the Western
tradition. However, the President of the Republic was
empowered temporarily to suspend any or all of these
individual rights if the public safety and order were
seriously disturbed or endangered. This proved a
temptation to every government, of whatever shade of
opinion, and in thirteen years it was invoked on more than
250 occasions. Upon the burning of the Reichstag, Hitler
attributed it to the Communists, although there was
substantial evidence at the Nuremberg Trial that the Nazis
burned themselves. In the excitement, he persuaded
President von Hindenburg to suspend all such rights. 13
They were never restored.
The French, taught by their history, provided for a very
different kind of emergency government, known as the
"state of siege." Unlike the German emergency dictatorship,
it can be invoked, not by action of the Executive, but as a
parliamentary measure. And, unlike the German, it is not
regarded as a suspension or abrogation of law but, with
characteristic French logic, is made a legal institution,
governed by legal principles and terminable by parliamentary
authority.
Great Britain also has fought both World Wars under a
temporary dictatorship of sorts. As there are no written
constitutional limitations upon the power of the British
Parliament, it simply provides a crisis government by
delegating a larger measure than usual of its own absolute
power to the Ministers, but always subject to recall at its
will and subject to its scrutiny and supervision in
administration. In each World War, Parliament, by its
Defense of the Realm Act, has delegated to its ministers
powers beyond those which Congress could delegate
consistently with our Bill of Rights.
It may be significant that the short-lived German
system, which resulted in dictatorship, allowed the
Executive to enhance its own power by suspending civil

13. The progress of measures for the overthrow of German freedoms is
traced in some detail in I Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (GPO 1947) 184, and
in more condensed form in the address opening, on behalf of the American
prosecution, the Nurnberg trial of the major Nazi war criminals, id., at 120.
Also reported 2 Proceedings, International Military Tribunal 105.

1096

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5 5

rights. Both France and England retain that power in the
Legislative branch, though in England the separation of
power is rather nominal. But all three countries invoked
emergency government as a political decision with which
the Judiciary had nothing to do. Neither in Germany,
France, nor England could any court set aside the
government's exercises of emergency power or review its
fundamental legality.
There is a popular impression, fostered by ignorance of
our history, that civil liberties in this country are not so
vulnerable, and that courts are always open as the
sanctuary from arbitrary government. The historical fact is,
however, that several ways have been found to close the
courts for any effective enforcement of civil rights and that
one sentence of our Constitution has proved sufficient to
introduce emergency government with about all the
freedom from judicial restraint that any dictator could ask.
That is Article I, Section 9, clause 2, which reads: "The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it." While courts might
inquire whether the conditions existed which permit the
suspension, "Invasion" might be construed to include an air
attack on any part of our territory-an extremely probable
incident of any war. There is authority to the effect that
only Congress can suspend the privilege, 14 but it was not
only suspended by President Lincoln-without authority
from Congress-he delegated authority to his generals to
suspend it in their discretion. In 1863, Congress authorized
and ratified the Presidential suspension and sought to
mitigate some of its abuses. 15
Civil War history teaches that suspension of privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is in effect a suspension of every
other liberty. President Lincoln at the outset of his
administration suspended the privilege and resorted to
wholesale arrests without warrants, detention without
trial, and imprisonment without judicial conviction.
Authorities say that there were certainly 13,000 of such

14. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807); Exparte Merryman,
17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487); see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 125 (1866).
15. Habeas Corpus Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 755.
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detentions for suspected disloyalty and estimates run the
figures as high as 38,000.16 Since the population of the
Northern States in 1860 was only about 22,000,000, the
Lincoln arrests without warrant probably would be
equivalent to arrest of 100,000 persons out of our present
population. This policy was sharply but unavailingly
condemned in May of 1861 by the aged Chief Justice Taney.
Let him state the case:
The case, then, is simply this: a military officer, residing in
Pennsylvania, issues an order to arrest a citizen of Maryland,
upon vague and indefinite charges, without any proof, so far as
appears; under this order, his house is entered in the night, he is
seized as a prisoner, and conveyed to Fort McHenry, and there
kept in close confinement; and when a habeas corpus is served on
the commanding officer, requiring him to produce the prisoner
before a justice of the supreme court, in order that he may
examine into the legality of the imprisonment, the answer of the
officer, is that he is authorized by the president to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus at his discretion, and in the exercise of that
discretion, suspends it in this case, and on that ground refuses
obedience to the writ.
As the case comes before me, therefore, I understand that the
president not only claims the right to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus himself, at his discretion, but to delegate that discretionary
power to a military officer, and to leave it to him to determine
whether he will or will not obey judicial process that may be
served upon him. "In such a case, my duty was too plain to be
mistaken. I have exercised all the power which the constitution
has been resisted by a
and laws confer upon me, but that 1power
7
force too strong for me to overcome."

Carl Sandburgi8 does not gloss over the abuses
committed under cover of suspension of the privilege of the
writ. Private mail was opened. Cabinet officers simply sent
telegrams ordering named persons to be arrested and held
without communication or counsel. General Burnside
suppressed the Chicago Times and seized its newspaper
plant. He also arrested Vallandigham, a rather scurvy
16. James Parker Hall, Free Speech in War Times, 21 COL. L. REV. 526

(1921). It is interesting to note that Dean Hall, on whose researches I rely, was
once associated with Mr. Mitchell in the practice of law in this City and was a
native of nearby Jamestown, NY.
17. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D.Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
18. 2 CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE WAR YEARS (1939), at 155-75.
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character, who had been in Congress and was the
Democratic candidate for Governor of Ohio. He was tried by
Military Commission and convicted. His application for a
writ of habeas corpus was denied upon the ground that
General Burnside had received authority to suspend the
writ. Lincoln then ordered Vallandigham to be transported
back of the Confederate lines and left there.
President Lincoln, in his famous letter to "Erastus
Corning and Others," in defending his conduct said all that
ever can be said, and what always is said, in favor of such
policies in time of emergency. He drew a distinction
between peacetime arrests and jailing men during rebellion.
In the latter case arrests are made not so much for what has been
done as for what probably would be done .... Under cover of
'liberty of speech,' 'liberty of the press' and 'habeas corpus' they
hoped to keep on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies,
informers, suppliers, and aiders and abettors of their cause in a
thousand ways .... Nothing is better known to history than that
courts of justice are utterly incompetent in such cases. Civil courts
are organized for trial of individuals ... in quiet times ....Again,
a jury too frequently has at least one member more ready to hang
the panel than to hang the traitor. 19

And he asked, "Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier
boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily
agitator who induces him to desert?" 20
President Lincoln there voiced the impatience with the
process of the civil courts that always develops in wartime
and the demand that various conduct or speech, believed
harmful to society, be punished summarily by some sort of
Military Commission. His suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus had opened the door to this
procedure, and it outlived him. On May 1, 1865, President
Johnson ordered a military commission to try those accused
of conspiracy to assassinate President Lincoln. The civil
courts were open and functioning in the District of
Columbia and the acts constituted crimes under its law.
The War Department set up this Commission, and two days
19. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others (June 13,
1863), reprinted in FRANK CROSBY, THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SIXTEENTH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1865).

20. Id.
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later it served its charges. A plea to the jurisdiction,
certainly one of substance in the light of later decisions, was
overruled on the day it was filed. On May 12, four days
after it was created, with the press and public excluded, the
Military Commission started the trial. Conviction followed
promptly. Application for a writ of habeas corpus was made
to the court in the District of Columbia, and the writ issued.
General Hancock made return refusing to produce the
defendants, by direction of the President, who ceded that,
"[t]he writ of habeas corpus has been heretofore suspended
in such cases as this, and I do specially suspend this writ
and direct you to proceed to execute" the judgment of the
Military Commission. Thereupon, the court ruled that it
21
must yield, and the sentences were carried into execution.
The performance of this Military Commission was hardly
an edifying example of the judicial process and soon the
Supreme Court decided Ex parte Milligan, by which the
supremacy of civil courts was restored.
Another method of closing the courts to aggrieved
citizens that is not wholly precluded by our Constitution is
the declaration of "martial law," which is nothing less than
the taking over by the army of civil authority in an area of
military operations where civil government is unable to
function. It is a law of necessity and is administered by
executive power. It was invoked, and most improvidently
used, during the recent war in the Hawaiian Islands, where
the conflict between civil and military power was sharp.
After hostilities ceased, it was finally curbed by the
Supreme Court. 22 While there is some judicial control of the
resort to martial law, the courts, as Chief Justice Taney
pointed out, have no force equal to the task if military
authorities refuse to heed them. The Hawaiian experience
is very instructive but too long to detail and is fully exposed
in legal literature. 23

21. DAVID E. HEROLD & BENN PITMAN, THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS (1865).
22. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).

23. The story of martial law in Hawaii may be found in many periodicals,
including Garner Anthony, Martial Law in Hawaii, 30 CAL. L. REV. 371 (1942);

Walter P. Armstrong, Martial Law in Hawaii, 29 A.B.A. J. 698 (1943); Charles
Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 1253 (1942); Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military
Jurisdiction-MartialRule in Hawaii and the Yamashita Case, 59 HARv. L. REV.
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Another device which has been used to take the law out
of the hands of the Judiciary has been to enact legislation to
deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction. Under our
constitutional structure, the Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction "with such exceptions and under such
regulations as Congress shall make. ' 24 In 1869, a case
involving the validity of certain "reconstruction" measures
had been argued and was under consideration by the
Supreme Court. Fearing an adverse decision, Congress,
over the veto of President Johnson, repealed the Act on
which its jurisdiction rested. 25 The Court thereupon
dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. 26 This practice
could be carried to almost any extreme that public
sentiment would tolerate.
Thus, you see in several ways judicial power can be
foreclosed from its ordinary function of standing between
the inhabitant and unlawful assertion of power by
government. Liberties are not so inflexibly buttressed as
most persons suppose and a public sentiment that would
sustain closing of the courts could lead to serious
consequences.
But if we assume that courts retain public confidence
and will not tolerate resort to any of these devices, the
judicial handling of wartime cases and controversies still
present disappointing departures, not only from the ideal,
but from the ordinary.
One of the weakest links in any system of adjudication
at any time is fact-finding. Through the jury system, the
public participates, indeed almost monopolizes, fact-finding
in administration of criminal justice. Ordinarily, an accused
feels this to be an assurance of fairness, because lay jurors
coming from the masses of the people are not likely to favor
833 (1946); Archibald King, The Legality of Martial Law in Hawaii, 30 Cal. L.
Rev. 599 (1942); Claude McColloch, Now It Can Be Told: Judge Metzger and the
Military, 55 A.B.A. J. 365 (1949).
24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
25. 15 Stat. 44, Mar. 27, 1868, repealing that part of 14 Stat. 385, Feb. 5,
1867, conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in habeas corpus
cases. As a study in political courage, one should read the veto message of
President Johnson, then undergoing his impeachment trial before the Senate
which passed the Act. See LLOYD PAUL STRYKER, ANDREW JOHNSON: A STUDY IN
COURAGE (1929).

26. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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harsh, oppressive, farfetched or merely technical
prosecutions. But, in wartime, the jury itself may be most
susceptible to inflamed opinion and return convictions
which judges, if the responsibility were theirs, might deny.
No matter how fair the judge tries to be, if the jury, by
radio, press and television, are constantly impressed that
the public expects and demands convictions, that
prosecution witnesses are credible, that defendants
have evil backgrounds, the verdict is apt to register this
prejudgment.
Judges, too, sometimes give way to passion and
partisanship. The judicial process works best in an
atmosphere of calmness, patience and deliberation. In times
of anxiety, the public demands haste and a show of zeal on
the part of judges, whose real duty is neutrality and
detachment.
Wartime psychology plays no favorites among rights
but tends to break down any right which obstructs its path.
And the fall of one weakens others. The Bill of Rights
Amendments were all adopted at one time and were
designed to present a comprehensive and integrated
pattern of a free society. The Constitution established
no priority among them. But, of late, one school of judges
has adopted as a principle of judicial decision that freedom
of speech, press, and assembly are "preferred rights" and
are to be given a "preferred position. '' 27 Large vested
interests engaged in communications enterprises welcome
this dissatisfaction. So also do the Communists, as these
happen to be the rights most frequently invoked to shelter
them in their attacks upon our Government. The great
difficulty with the preferred-rights doctrine is that it crowds
some others into the position of deferred rights. There is
some indication, for example, that freedom from
unreasonable searches
and seizures does not enjoy the
preferred rating. 28
So-called property rights are, of course, among the
deferred, and they are especially vulnerable in wartime.
27. See dissent, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949), and
cases there cited. Cf. United States v. Rabinowitz 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947).

28. See supra note 27.
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The two provisions of the Constitution most often invoked
in behalf of them are the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the provision of the Fifth
Amendment that private property shall not be taken for
public use except upon just compensation. There has been a
sharp and desirable reaction from that period when a court
could say, "It should be remembered that of the three
fundamental principles which underlie government, and for
which government exists, the protection of life, liberty and
property, the chief of these is property ....- 29
Property is particularly vulnerable in modern war.
Communism and Socialism have no more effective allies
and promoters than total war. Control of prices, allocation
of raw materials, priorities in transportation, requisitions,
compulsory orders, and renegotiations, leave little of the
system of private enterprise. Military socialization comes
wrapped in patriotism, while political socialization is
deemed alien and un-American. Wartime business and
property controls usually outlast the wars. It is no accident
that the European peoples who have had total war and
most complete militarization find it so easy to adopt
socialization. No one who follows the trend of decision
mould expect the courts to be a bulwark against it in
wartime, if indeed they are at any time.
But our forefathers deemed the personal right to
acquire, own, and manage property as one of those liberties
essential to a free society. A large degree of freedom from
government control in these matters was as much a part of
their philosophy as was freedom from interference in
speech, press, or religion. It may be open to question
whether we can completely abandon laissez faire as to
property and retain it as to person. When acceptance of a
war order is compulsory on an employer, it is more easy to
argue that labor to perform it should be compulsory. When
scarce materials are allocated the argument is strengthened
for allocation of labor. Each liberty found in our Bill of
Rights furnishes a sort of lateral support for every other,
and when one is withdrawn or deferred the foundations of
all are weakened.
Property and enterprise, of course, require more
29. Children's Hosp. v. Adkins, 284 F. 613, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1922) (setting
aside the Minimum Wage Law of the District of Columbia).
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regulation than persons, but hostility to property as an
institution was no part of our constitutional scheme and
should find no place in its interpretation. Wisely or not, our
forefathers regarded the personal right to acquire,
accumulate, and enjoy property as the great incentive to
individual effort. If not controlled in the interests of society,
it can be abused, especially where exploitation of natural
resources or the labor of others is involved. But those
countries which, under Communist domination, have
largely abolished the property incentive have felt obliged to
substitute a far more harsh and oppressive system of labor
compulsion, enforced by penalties upon the person. Bad as
the evils of out system may be painted, they do not equal
those of the only alternative yet brought forth-mass
transfers from the country to the factories, forced labor,
work camps, heavy penalties for absenteeism and for failure
to meet standards of quantity or quality in production. The
most callous and brutal of all inducements to labor are
those applied by the dictator state. In fact, there is reason
to believe that even they are returning to the incentive
system, because they find compulsion has passed the point
of diminishing returns.
Moreover, we must not forget that enjoyment of
personal rights often will depend upon enjoyment of some
property right. For example, what is modern freedom of the
press worth without the right to occupy a costly plant, hire
competent labor, and obtain adequate paper and supplies?
A high-handed government could do much to get rid of an
objectionable newspaper without passing any law abridging
freedom of the press. The government might, for example,
condemn the newspaper building and even the physical
presses and equipment for its own use. Courts will not
inquire into the justification for an exercise of eminent
domain. But, under recently approved practice, it need not
even put the owner in funds to replace the building, for it
need not take the title. Instead, the government may take
only the use-and that for an unstated time-and pay only
the rental as it accrues. 30 Even if the owner has other
resources to build a new plant, he may find himself blocked
in getting scarce materials or transportation priorities, or
subject to discrimination in rationing of paper. When in
30. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 261
(1950), and cases there cited.
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these matters he turns to the courts, he has little relief from
these administrative decisions, and that little long-delayed.
Meanwhile, he is out of business, his advertising customers
gone, his subscribers vanished, his goodwill destroyed.
Certainly if an evil government desired to destroy freedom
of a hostile press, it would approach it, not through direct
suppression, but through unfair administration of property
regulations. That is why any doctrine of deferred rights is
dangerous and especially if we defer those rights that are
an essential to fair administration of the laws.
I suppose the American people, on whose eternal
vigilance liberty ultimately depends, are well agreed that
what they want of the courts is that they both preserve
liberty and protect security, finding ways to reconcile the
two needs so that we do not lose our heritage in defending
it.
The issue that usually comes to the courts, however, is
not a clear and simple one between security and liberty.
The issue as we get it is more nearly this: measures
violative of constitutional rights are claimed to be necessary
to security, in the judgment of officials who are best in a
position to know, but the necessity is not provable by
ordinary evidence and the court is in no position to
determine the necessity for itself. What does it do then? The
best study of the impact of such claims upon the judicial
process during wartime is Korematsu v. United States,31 the
precedent that I fear will long be most useful to justify
wartime invasions of civil liberty. It was not a case where
the Court was asked by a citizen to obstruct execution by
military authorities of a military order. It was a case where
the Government asked the Court to become, itself, the
agency to enforce against the citizen, by criminal process, a
military policy of dubious constitutionality. That policy was
to remove all persons of Japanese ancestry, including
native-born American citizens, from the west coast and
herd them into camps in the interior. When enforcement of
that measure came squarely before the Supreme Court,
three judicial policies were advocated, none of which can be
said to be wholly satisfying.
One view, certainly the popular view at the time, was
sponsored in the opinion of Mr. Justice Black, with support
31. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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of Chief Justice Stone, Justices Reed, Douglas, and
Rutledge, and a concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter.
It held exclusion and detention of citizens of Japanese
ancestry constitutionally valid. Korematsu, it reasoned, was
detained because military authorities feared an invasion
and felt constrained to take proper security measures. "The
need for action was great, and time was short." The Court
refused to say that the "actions were unjustified" and held
them constitutional. Another course was proposed by Mr.
Justice Roberts and, for different reasons, by Mr. Justice
Murphy. Both refused to yield to the doctrine of military
necessity and declared the measure "a clear violation of
constitutional rights," let the chips fall where they would. It
seemed to me then, and does now, that the measure was an
unconstitutional one which the Court should not bring
within the Constitution by any doctrine of necessity, a
doctrine too useful as a precedent. I thought the courts
should not lend themselves to its enforcement and we
should discharge the prisoner from custody under judicial
commitment. But had the military authorities attempted to
enforce the measure by their own force and authority, the
Court should not attempt active interference, since the
West Coast was then a proper theatre for military
operations. I can add nothing to my dissent in the case,
though I have to admit that my view, if followed, would
come close to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
recognition of a state of martial law at the time and place
found proper for military control.
Temperate and thoughtful people had difficulties in
such conflicts which only partisans had no trouble in
deciding wholly one way or the other. It is easy, by giving
way to the passion, intolerance, and suspicions of wartime,
to reduce our liberties to a shadow, often in answer to
exaggerated claims of security. Also, it is easy, by
contemptuously ignoring the reasonable anxieties of
wartime as mere "hysteria," to set the stage for by-passing
courts which the public thinks have become too naive, too
dilatory and too sympathetic with their enemies and
betrayers. Lax law enforcement is the enemy of civil rights
under law, for it creates the demand for the military trial
and for extralegal vigilante organizations, such as the illfamed American Protective League of the First World War.
And if the people come deeply to feel that civil rights are
being successfully turned against their institutions by their
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enemies, they will react by becoming enemies of civil rights.
Such was the case in the Lincoln era-there is no doubt
where popular feeling stood in the contest between Lincoln
and Taney. After all, we have to acknowledge the historical
fact that international hostility has resulted in surprise
attacks and conquests, in unanticipated disasters and
overthrows, and in catastrophic treachery and betrayals.
The Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, followed
by their destruction of all civil rights of those who had
shown them tolerance, poses the dilemma of all free people.
There the Benes-Masaryk government was completely
tolerant of Communist opposition. They were allowed
generous liberties of press and speech and assembly. They
were even taken into high posts in government, because
they claimed to represent a substantial minority of the
citizenship. That liberty was used to overthrow liberty and
to set up a murderous regime which tolerated not the
slightest deviation in thought, speech, or action from the
Communist dogma. Perhaps they could not have succeeded
but for their geographic location and the proximity of a Red
army. But the example of Communist abuse of
Czechoslovakian liberty will long make difficult the path of
those who would give complete liberty of action to internal
enemies.
The American dilemma is perhaps best illustrated by
that scene in Masonic Hall at Baltimore, when Chief
Justice Taney heard the return to his writ of habeas corpus
to military authorities who were holding Merryman without
charges, warrant, trial, or conviction. Taney, the
constitutionalist, was outraged by this flagrant invasion of
Merryman's constitutional rights. These he would protect,
even if in doing so he gave free rein to those who sought
overthrow of the Union. In the White House was a man who
would preserve the Union, even by disregarding
constitutional rights of those fomenting rebellion. It may be
that his extreme measures were not necessary, that the war
would have been won without them. But I suppose a poll to
name the greatest benefactor of freedom this country ever
had would result in a heavy majority for Abraham Lincoln.
The issue between authority and liberty is not between a
right and a wrong-that never presents a dilemma. The
dilemma is because the conflict is between two rights, each
in its own way important. Taney in the light of his duties
was right, and Lincoln in the light of his duty was right.
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And if logic supports Taney, history vindicates Lincoln.
It is customary to tell students how urgently these
great issues challenge them, and how soon they will have to
face the greatest challenge of history. I forbear such
extravagances. The problem of liberty and authority ahead
are slight in comparison with those of the 1770s or the
1860s. We shall blunder and dispute, and decide and
overrule decisions. And the common sense of the American
people will preserve us from all extremes which would
destroy our heritage.

